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ON CHOICE OF LAW
AND THE GREAT QUEST:
A CRITIQUE OF SPECIAL
MULTISTATE SOLUTIONS TO
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS
Robert Allen Sedler*
The clear majority of state courts now employ policy-centered
approaches to resolve choice-of-law problems. 1 Experience with
these approaches demonstrates that the results in actual cases are
not likely to depend upon which particular policy-centered methodology a court formally adopts, or whether a court even commits
itself to a specific policy-centered theory. As Professor Leflar notes,
Most of the current cases follow a pattern of multiple citation,
seldom relying solely upon any single modern choice-of-law
theory, but combining two or more of the theories to produce
results which, interestingly, can be sustained under any or
nearly all of the new non-mechanical approaches to conflicts
2

law.

In reality, however, policy-centered courts generally make choiceof-law decisions in accordance with the "Currie version" of interest
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959, University of

Pittsburgh.
1. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 976 n.2 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law]. Now that Arkansas and Texas have abandoned the traditional approach, see Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550
S.W.2d 453 (1977); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979), the breakdown
among the 50 states and the District of Columbia is as follows: 29 states have
adopted a "modem" approach, 16 have adhered to the traditional approach, 6 have
not yet passed on the question. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra, at 976
n.2. The question almost invariably arises in the context of whether the court will
continue to follow the place-of-the-wrong rule in torts cases. For discussion of the
policy-centered approach, see Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial
Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 KY. L.J. 27, 57-61 (1967). In
practice, all courts that have abandoned the traditional approach make the choice-oflaw decision with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.
2. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.,
Spring 1977, at 10, at 10.
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analysis: 3 They decide cases by referring to the policies and inter-

ests of the involved states and by considering the fairness to the
parties of applying a particular state's law. 4 This analysis almost in-

variably leads the forum state to apply its own law whenever there
is a real interest in implementing its policies. 5
Modern academic commentary likewise seems less concerned

3. See B. CUmuE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED ESSAYS]. For a discussion of Currie's interest-analysis ap-

proach, see Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 183-90 (1977).
4. As I have explained elsewhere, the forum's real interest is determined by
whether the policy behind the forum's rule will be significantly advanced
by its application to a situation containing a foreign element. . . . [either
considerations [e.g., the "obvious interest" of another state or possible unfairness to the parties] are relevant only insofar as they assist in the resolution of this question.
Sedler, supra note 3, at 222-23 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also id. at
222-27.
5. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 227-33.
Once the forum determines that it has a real interest in applying its law
the court should apply it, without considering whether any other involved
state also has a real interest in the application of its own law. The primary
reason for my advocating such application of forum law is my view that in a
conflicts case the proper function of a court is to advance its own policies
and interests rather than to advance "multistate policies."
Id. at 227 (footnote omitted). Fairness to the parties is an independent choice-of-law
consideration, of course, and the court will not apply its own law if to do so would
be fundamentally unfair to one or both of the parties. Usually, however, interest and
fairness coincide. Whenever the question has been raised, courts have found that application of their law was not unfair to the other party. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren,
475 F.2d 438, 444-46 (2d Cir. 1973) (New York wrongful death statute, N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967), embodying strong state policy
against damage limitations held applicable in suit by estate of New York decedent
against Massachusetts defendants for malpractice in Massachusetts); Miller v. Miller,
22 N.Y.2d 12, 19-22, 237 N.E.2d 877, 881-82, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 740-42 (1968) (Maine
statute limiting wrongful death recoveries held inapplicable to claim involving New
York victim and New York defendant residing in Maine at time of Maine accident).
In fact, the same factors that would produce even possible unfairness to one or both
of the parties by application of a state's law often will indicate the lack of a real interest in applying that law. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 222-23. In the torts area, at
least, it is possible to explain the results of the courts' decisions in terms of rules of
choice of law. Choice-of-law rules are developed by decisions in actual cases
through the normal workings of binding precedent and stare decisis in the common
law tradition. See generally Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 1. There is
substantial agreement among the courts on the preferred solution in most conflictstorts situations. See id. at 1032-41. I have identified nine rules of choice of law in the
tort area. Id. There is agreement among the courts on six of these rules of choice of
law, and the disagreement over the other three can be likened to majority-minority
rules in other areas. Id.
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with methodology than with results and preferred solutions to
choice-of-law problems. On the assumption that choice-of-law decisions will generally be based on considerations of policy and fairness, commentators have focused on what policies should be considered, what results are fair and functionally sound, and, especially,
how the conflicting interests of the involved states can be accom6
modated in the context of conflicts litigation.
An obvious advantage of a policy-centered approach is that it
simplifies identification of the "easy" case where the claims of one
state's law to application are "plainly preponderant." 7 These cases
include both the classic "false conflict ' 8 and the "apparent conflict"
that can be avoided by a "more moderate and restrained interpretation" of the policy or interest of one state. 9 A considerable number of litigated cases fall into these categories, 10 but many do not.
It is the situation where both states have a real interest in applying

6. See, e.g., Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60

CORNELL L. REv. 927 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Von Mehren, Choice-of-Law Methodology]; Von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1977, at 27, at 32-33 [hereinafter cited as Von Mehren,
Problem of Justice].
7.

This phrase is taken from D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 122

(1965).
8. A false conflict arises "[w~hen a consideration of the policies and interests of
the involved states leads to the conclusion that one state has an interest in having its
law applied on the point in issue while the other state does not." Sedler, supra note
3, at 186.
9. As to avoiding the "apparent conflict," see the discussion in Sedler, supra
note 3, at 187-88. According to Currie's analysis, if each involved state has a possible
interest, the court should reexamine the states' respective policies and interests and
question whether a more moderate and restrained interpretation of one state's policies or interests would avoid the conflict. B. CURuE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3,at 176, 186. In my
view, this step in Currie's methodology is properly subsumed in the matter of
determining the forum's real interest in applying its own law. See Sedler, supra, at
220-21. The comparative-impairment methodology, whereby a court resolves a true
conflict by deciding which state's interest will be less impaired by nonapplication of
its law, is also used in part to identify the situation where the claims of one state's
law to application are "plainly preponderant." See Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
255, 266-76 (1978).
10. The most common situation is where two parties from a liability state are
involved in an accident in a nonliability state. Beginning with Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), it is this situation that has
been the impetus for courts to abandon the place-of-the-wrong rule in favor of a
"modern approach" to choice of law. See generally Comment, False Conflicts,
55 CALIF. L. REv. 74 (1967).
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their law on the point in issue"-what Currie called the "true
conflict" 2 -that is now the focal point of academic concern. 13
Currie, of course, maintained that when a true conflict exists,
the forum should apply its own law;14 as I have demonstrated elsewhere, this is what courts are generally doing in practice.1 5 I have

also explained why I think that this is what courts should do, although my reasons differ to some extent from Currie's.' 6 This solution, however, continues to be unacceptable to most academic
commentators, and the "Great Quest" for solutions to the true conflict' 7 may be expected to continue.

Proposed solutions to the true conflict other than by the forum
applying its own law generally have not involved "interest weighing,"' but instead have been based on considerations of multistate
interests, the nature of the laws involved, the parties' expectations,

and like concerns. 19 The proponents of these solutions attack Currie's forum-law approach because it precludes consideration of
multistate concerns and any effort at accommodating conflicting
state interests.2 0 I have attempted to answer these criticisms elsewhere; 2 ' suffice it to say that experience shows that courts are not

disposed to subordinate the real interests of their state to
multistate concerns. Courts purporting to apply objective criteria

11.

In practically every case, only two states are involved, so it is convenient to

use the tvo-state example. In the exceedingly rare case where more than two states
are involved, the forum would consider the policy and the interest of the third state
in the same manner as it would consider the policy and interest of the second state.
12. B. CURIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 77, 107-08.
13. See, e.g., Von Mehren, Choice-of-Law Methodology, supra note 6;
Weintraub, The Future of Choice of Law for Torts: What Principles Should Be
Preferred?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1977, at 146.
14. B. CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 77, 119-27.
15. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 228-31.
16. Compare id. at 216-20, 227-33 with B. CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at
77, 119-27.
17. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 296 (2d ed.
1975).
18. For the meaning of "interest weighing," see B. CURRIE, Notes on Methods
and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 176,
182.
19. Sedler, supra note 3, at 217-18 & n.219. See also Weintraub, supra note 13.
As to "interest weighing" in comparative-impairment methodology, see Kanowitz,
supra note 9, at 274-78.
20. See, e.g., Von Mehren, Problem of Justice, supra note 6, at 33-34.
21. Sedler, supra note 3, at 192-94, 218-20.
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to resolve true conflicts are likely to skew the criteria in favor of
their own law. 2 2 There are very few cases in recent years where
the forum did not apply its own law where it had a real interest in
doing so. 2 3 While commentators may continue to propose other solutions to the true conflict, it is unlikely that they will find much
favor with the courts.
However, this does not mean that in any conflicts case the forum state will automatically apply its own law. 24 Quite the contrary, courts have been very sensitive in conflicts cases to the existence of competing concerns and have generally determined their
own interests and the scope of their own policy with restraint and
moderation. They will not apply their own law if they conclude
that the policy reflected in that law is not advanced significantly by
its application in the circumstances presented.2 5 Courts have not
followed a policy of "forum preference," but of advancing the forum's real interests. 26 On the whole, this has produced functionally
22. See id. at 231-33. An excellent example of this skewing is the decision of
the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). For discussion of
Bernhard, see text accompanying notes 42-53 infra. However, in the recent case of
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978), the California Supreme Court purported to resolve a true conflict
between its interest and Louisiana's in favor of Louisiana by finding that its own interest would be "comparatively less impaired" if subordinated in the particular case.
Id. at 164-70, 583 P.2d at 726-29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872-75. Although I seriously question whether the court's express and actual rationales are the same, I must postpone
my analysis of this case. For an excellent discussion of the decision, see Kanowitz,
supra note 9, at 294-300.
23. For discussion of these exceptions, see Sedler, supra note 3, at 228 n.259.
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978), must be added to the list, at least at this time. See note 22 supra.
24. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 222-27.
25. This principle is also illustrated by the false-conflict cases where suit is
brought in the "disinterested state." See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562,
447 P.2d 254 (1968); Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (App.
Div. 1968). In the typical situation, "the plaintiff's home state is interested in applying its law allowing recovery, while the [disinterested state] generally has no interest in applying its law denying recovery in favor of a nonresident defendant."
Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 1034.
26. The one notable exception, in my view, is where two parties from a
nonrecovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery state and the recovery
state applies its own law to allow recovery. This is what the majority of the courts
have done, and these decisions can be explained simply in terms of the forum's preference for its own "better law." See, e.g., Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky.
1968); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Griggs v. Riley,
489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624
(1972). Some courts, however, have denied recovery here. See, e.g., Vick v. Cochran,
316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975); Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1972). See also
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sound results.27
Cognizant perhaps of the forum's unwillingness to displace its
own law with that of another state whenever it has a real interest
in applying its law to effectuate underlying policies, commentators
have proposed yet another means of resolving the true conflict:
special multistate solutions that accommodate conflicting interests
in the particular case without requiring that either interest yield
completely. Professor von Mehren and Professor Weintraub propose "substantive" multistate solutions, while Professor Twerksi
and Ms. Mayer present a "procedural" one. The substantive solutions purportedly compromise the differing substantive rules, while
the procedural solution purportedly accommodates the differing
substantive interests through procedural techniques.
Both the substantive and procedural solutions assume that it is
desirable to accommodate conflicting governmental interests, and
that the forum should want to do so instead of advancing its own
real interests. Professor von Mehren, for example, argues that
multistate solutions can be formulated that "achieve decisional uniformity or other values of conflicts justice without requiring one
state to sacrifice entirely its views respecting aptness,"2 8 and that
"[b]y according roughly equal respect to the views of each legal order, a basis may be created for agreement upon a mutually acceptable governing rule."2 9 The question still remains why the forum
should want to sacrifice its views respecting aptness at all. Why
should the forum want to subordinate its own interest, even in
part, when (1) the reasons for applying its own law in the domestic
Sedler, supra note 3, at 226-27. Interestingly enough, some commentators who have
advanced alternative solutions to the true conflict advocate applying the law of the
state of injury in this situation. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
139-45 (1965); Hancock, Some Choice-of-Law Problems Posed by Antiguest Statutes:
Realism in Wisconsin and Rule-Fetishism in New York, 27 STAN. L. REV. 775, 781-82
(1975); Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 469-72
(1967).
27. While I have always maintained that this is so, I am pleased to see that Professor Leflar is of the same opinion. See Leflar, supra note 2, passim. Indeed, while
expressing disagreement with particular decisions by particular courts, and while often expressing disagreement with a particular rationale, most commentators probably
would not dispute the contention that on the whole, courts have reached functionally
sound results in the cases coming before them for decision.
28. Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their
Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 347, 359 (1974). By "aptness" Von Mehren means the most appropriate regulation of the situation from the perspective of the legal order in question. See id. at
350.
29. Id. at 359.
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case are equally cogent in a conflicts case, 30 and (2) the application
of its own law is not fundamentally unfair to the other party and
hence is fully constitutional? 31 "Conflicts justice" is largely an academic construct. It is not the court's function in a conflicts case to
"polic[e] the interstate and international legal order";32 rather, it' is
assigned the task of achieving a functionally sound and fair result in
the case before it. In short, the arguments in favor of special
multistate solutions do not differ appreciably from the arguments in
favor of the "displacement" solutions to the true conflict, and their
proponents have not effectively explained why the forum should
sacrifice its "views respecting aptness" in favor of a special multistate solution.
The proposed special multistate solutions can also be challenged on their own terms: They do not do what they purport to
do. They do not succeed in accommodating the interests of the involved states in the context of conflicts litigation, and for this
reason-even on the premise that the forum should want to make
such an accommodation-they are unlikely to prove acceptable to
the courts. The following discussion will try to demonstrate this
point in regard to each of the proposed special multistate solutions.
SUBSTANTIVE SOLUTIONS

Professor von Mehren's multistate scheme seeks to find a "mutually acceptable governing rule" in the tort area by "compromising
differences on the basis of the relative strength of each legal order's
claim to regulate." 33 He uses the example of a dog owned by a resident of state A straying into state B where it bites a resident of
state B. State B imposes strict liability, while state A only holds
the owner liable if the owner had knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite, which cannot be shown here. Since plaintiff's state
34
imposes liability and defendant's does not, a true conflict exists.
30. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 227.
31. For constitutional purposes, a state may generally apply its own law whenever it has an interest in doing so and application of its own law is not fundamentally unfair to the other party, or that state has sufficient factual contacts with the
transaction so that it is reasonable for it to apply its law to the transaction on the
basis of those contacts despite its lack of interest in doing so. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun
Insurance Co., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
32. Sedler, supra note 3, at 227.
33. Von Mehren, supra note 28, at 366.
34. Insofar as state B's policy is also an admonitory one, it would have interest
in applying its rule of strict liability whenever the harm occurred in state B,
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Von Mehren's solution is to allow the state B plaintiff to recover
half the actual damages. As he explains: "The multistate rule proposed, unlike a domestic-rule solution, thus recognizes that both
states have legitimate interests in the situation. If the resulting
compromise is acceptable to both legal orders, the policies of aptness and decisional harmony would be effectively accommodated." 35 Von Mehren gives other examples of splitting the difference in accident cases where more than one state has an interest. 36
He refers to this solution as "giv[ing] half a loaf" to each state,
and compromising the disagreement "with equal weight accorded
to the views of each state." 37 He contends that to the extent that
choice-of-law solutions advance the cause of equal treatment instead of merely advancing the forum's interest, they promote "conflicts justice." 38
Again leaving aside the question of whether the forum properly should sacrifice its own real interests to the cause of "conflicts
justice," the soundness of the proposed solution can be fairly considered on Von Mehren's own terms: Is the resulting compromise
"'acceptable to both legal orders"? This question, it must be
remembered, arises in the context of litigation between private
persons. In the conflicts case, as in the domestic case, the court's
primary concern is achieving a sound and fair result between the
parties. The accommodation of state interests, therefore, must be
related to the private legal context in which the question arises. 39
While under interest analysis reference is made to the policies and
interests of the involved states, it is for the purpose of resolving
disputes between private parties.
Although a state may have a strong interest in the outcomes of
private litigation, 40 advancement of the state's interest cannot be
separated from its effect on the case before the court. The ultimate
question, then, is whether accommodating conflicting state interirrespective of the residence of the victim. It must also be assumed in this situation
that the dog owner's residence is sufficiently close to the state B line that it is rea-

sonably foreseeable that the dog could stray into state B. See text accompanying
notes 46 & 47 infra.
35. Von Mehren, supra note 28, at 366-67 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 367-70; Von Mehren, Problem of Justice, supra note 6, at 40-42.
37. Von Mehren, Problem of Justice, supra note 6, at 39-40.
38. Id. at 43.
39. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 191.
40. Id. at 191-92. This is clearly so whenever the litigation involves regulatory
or protective laws that are aimed at social engineering, and the state is relying on the
private persons whose interests are affected by those laws to implement the socialengineering policy.
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ests in the manner proposed by Von Mehren will (1) effectively accommodate those interests in light of the conflicting policies reflected in the laws of the involved states, and (2) produce a sound
and fair result between the parties.
Applying these criteria, first consider Von Mehren's dogbite illustration from the perspective of state A. State A's rule is that the
dog owner should not be liable at all unless plaintiff can prove
prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite. The state has an
interest in protecting state A dog owners from liability if they lack
such knowledge, and its policy and interest is the same irrespective
of where the dogbite occurs. Since state A's hypothetical dog
owner had no knowledge of his dog's proclivity to bite, imposing
any liability defeats state A's policy; its policy is no less defeated by
imposing liability and reducing the amount of damages. The conflict between state A law and state B law is over the circumstances
in which liability should be imposed, not the amount of damages
recoverable once liability has been found. Reducing the plaintiff's
damages by half, then, does not advance the defendant-protecting
policy of state A, since the state A defendant is not shielded from
liability in circumstances where state A has concluded that
41
dogowners should be free from culpability.
Von Mehren's proposed compromise requires less sacrifice by
state B. Strict liability, the basis of state B's policy, is imposed in
favor of the state B plaintiff. But a state B court will find it irrational to reduce the recovery, and thus defeat its own award rationale, when to do so does not advance state A's policy to protect
the defendant from liability in these circumstances. The real
beneficiary of the compromise is neither state A, whose policy is
thwarted whenever liability is imposed in the absence of knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite, nor state B, whose policy is
thwarted by unnecessarily halving its plaintiff's recovery, but the
state A defendant and insurer, who end up paying less damages
simply because the defendant is from a state that would not impose
liability in the first place.
Von Mehren's compromise thus fails to accommodate the conflicting interests of the involved states. Where differences in policy
relate to when liability should be imposed, the conflicting policies

41. If, however, one state limited liability for damages for wrongful death to
$50,000 and the other state allowed unlimited recovery, reducing the amount of recovery by half the difference between $50,000 and the amount of the award would
advance the policies of both states with respect to the matter in issue.
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are not accommodated in any rational way by imposing liability,
but halving the damages. It is difficult to see how such a solution
advances "conflicts justice," even in the abstract. Surely it will not
appear to the courts of either state to produce a sound and fair result in the particular case.
To illustrate this point in a more realistic setting, consider
Bernhardv. Harrah's Club,4 2 another situation where Von Mehren
would split the difference. In this case the California forum applied
its law and allowed a California victim to recover for an automobile
accident in California caused by an intoxicated driver served liquor
at a tavern in Nevada located near the California state line. California law imposed civil liability on tavernkeepers in these circumstances; Nevada law did not.43 Von Mehren agrees that if suit had
been brought in Nevada, Nevada probably would have applied its
law and denied recovery.4 4 He suggests that here it would be possible to strike a "mutually acceptable compromise" by imposing liability, but allowing the plaintiff to recover only half the damages.
He states:
Viewing the situation overall, the principle of advancement of
values is as effectively served by compromise as it would be by
a solution in terms of subordination; at the same time, a result is
reached that might well prove acceptable to both Nevada and
California and thus satisfy the principle of equal treatment. 45
As in the dogbite example, this result would be unacceptable
to both states. The Nevada defendant suffers liability in circumstances where Nevada law precludes liability; Nevada's policy of
protecting tavernkeepers from civil liability for serving liquor to intoxicated patrons is no less frustrated when the tavernkeeper is responsible for half, rather than full, damages. So, too, California will
find it unpalatable to deny the California plaintiff full compensation
solely because the tavernkeeper is from a state that would not
impose liability in the first place.
42.
(1976).

16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859

43. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979) (misdemeanor
for tavernkeeper to serve intoxicated customers); CAL. EviD. CODE § 669 (West
Supp. 1979) (negligence presumed when misdemeanor violated). While Nevada statutory and common law were silent on the question, the court proceeded on the assumption that a Nevada court would not impose liability in these circumstances. 16
Cal. 3d at 315, 546 P.2d at 721, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
44. Von Mebren, Problem of Justice, supra note 6, at 41-42. Accord, Kanowitz,
supra note 9, at 263-64.
45. Von Mehren, Problem of Justice, supra note 6, at 42.
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At this juncture it is essential to pose the conflicts issue in
Bernhard more precisely, as it would be seen from the perspective
of a California court responsible for achieving a sound and fair result in the case before it. Two additional facts are important: The
Nevada tavernkeeper actively solicited California customers, and
the tavern was located sufficiently close to the California state line
so that the tavernkeeper could foresee that serving liquor to an intoxicated person could cause harm in California. These factors
make it reasonable, and hence constitutional, for California to exercise jurisdiction in this case under its long-arm act, 46 as well as to
apply its own law on the issue of the tavernkeeper's civil liability to
the California accident victim. 4 7 The California plaintiff was injured
in California by a force put in motion by a Nevada defendant that
foreseeably could, and in fact did, cause harm in California. Imposing liability both advances the policy and interest of California
and produces no unfairness to the Nevada defendant. The result,
sound and fair as between the parties, promotes justice; if Von
Mehren's conception of "conflicts justice" requires a different result, then the justice of "conflicts justice" must be questioned.
From the perspective of a Nevada court, applying Nevada law
to deny recovery would produce a sound and fair result. 48 There is
no need, however, to explore this alternative position: A suit
arising out of this transaction would never be brought in Nevada.
The plaintiff, weighing the tendency of the forum to apply its own
law, would sue in California and obtain jurisdiction under the
California long-arm act. 49 Von Mehren argues that special
multistate solutions will promote "decisional harmony" between
the involved states while accommodating the "aptness" of their
conflicting regulatory schemes. 5 0 But there is no reason to search
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). It is interesting to note that
the defendant apparently raised no challenge to the exercise of California's jurisdiction in Bernhard. California courts are specifically authorized by statute to exercise
jurisdiction within constitutional limits. Id.
47. The same factors that make it reasonable and constitutional for a state to exercise long-arm jurisdiction in a particular case also make it reasonable and constitutional for a state to apply its own substantive law in that case. See Sedler, JudicialJurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L.
REv. 1031, 1032 (1978).
48. Nevada has an interest in applying its law to protect the Nevada
tavernkeeper who acted in Nevada, notwithstanding that his act created a
foreseeable risk of harm in California, the result is not unfair to the California victim,
who did not "'rely" on California law before getting injured in the accident.
49. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
50. Von Mehren, supra note 28, at 366-67.
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for solutions promoting "decisional harmony" between California
and Nevada since it is purely academic how a Nevada court would
have decided Bernhard. Von Mehren's concept of "decisional harmony," like "conflicts justice," is an abstraction unrelated to the
usual realities of conflicts litigation. In a conflicts case the plaintiff
will try to bring suit in the state whose "whole law" is more favorable to the plaintiff, since that state is more likely to make a choiceof-law decision that will enable the plaintiff to prevail. Assuming
that both involved states employ a policy-centered approach to
choice of law, and that both states can properly exercise jurisdiction, the plaintiff will sue in the state with the more favorable substantive law on the very reasonable supposition that it is much
easier to persuade a court to apply its own law than it is to persuade the court to displace it.
Now that the constitutionality of jurisdiction is determined
functionally by considering "minimum contacts and fundamental
fairness," 51 courts need not search for choice-of-law solutions that
supposedly promote "decisional harmony." The realities of conflicts
litigation-the forum's likely application of its own law and the
plaintiff's likely choice of a forum with the most beneficial substantive law-indicate that conflicts jurisprudence should focus on
where suit is likely to be brought, and whether the selected forum
can permissibly exercise jurisdiction. In this realistic context, Von
Mehren's reliance on a multistate proposal that purportedly advances "decisional harmony" by satisfying the policies of both interested states is doubly misplaced. In fact, the conflicting interests of the involved states are not harmonized; in theory, Von
Mehren's goal to harmonize decisions is irrelevant since cases like
Bernhard will never be brought in Nevada. Von Mehren's search
for a decision acceptable to both California and Nevada courts is
simply unnecessary. To avoid this misguided emphasis, conflicts
scholars should strive to relate choice of law to judicial jurisdiction, 52 and focus on the soundness of the solutions reached by the
court of permissible jurisdiction. Thus, the determinative question
in Bernhard should be whether the California court, justifiably
51. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
52. As to the relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law, see Sedler,
supra note 47, and Sedler, JudicialJurisdictionand Choice of Law in Interstate Accident Cases: The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 329. See
also Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex
Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965).
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exercising jurisdiction over the case before it, reached a sound and
fair result. The court's decision clearly satisfies that test. 53
Professor Weintraub, attempting a different multistate solution,
proposes a "new rule" approach designed to "resolve a particular issue
in a conflicts problem by applying law that is not the domestic law
of any of the contact jurisdictions, but represents a new rule crafted
to give maximum effect and to cause minimal impairment to the rel54
evant and otherwise irreconcilable polices of the contact states."
Weintraub's primary illustration of the "new rule" approach is the
usurious interstate small-loan transaction, 55 where he proposes a
"new rule" that goes "beyond d6pegage" and combines the laws
of
involved states into a special multistate solution. He notes that
when the transaction is connected with the borrower's home state,
the law of that state is likely to be applied in a suit brought by the
lender 5 -- at least, I would add, by the courts of that state. 5 7 The
more difficult situation, Weintraub asserts, arises when (1) the
lender did not solicit the loan in the borrower's state; (2) the transaction is connected entirely with the lender's state; and (3) the
transaction is completely valid under the law of the lender's state,
but completely invalid under the law of the borrower's state. In
other words, if the law of the borrower's state is applied, the stayat-home lender-acting completely within a state that legitimizes
the transaction-is not only unable to recover interest above the
rate established by the borrower's state, but is not even able to enforce the contract as to the unpaid principal.
Weintraub reviews the arguments justifying application of the
law of the borrower's or lender's home state, and concludes that
while it would be unfair to the lender to apply the law of the borrower's state, the unfairness does not rise to constitutional di53. See notes 46 & 47 supra and accompanying text. See generally note 5 supra.
54. Weintraub, Beyond Dpepage: A "New Rule" Approach to Choice of Law
in Consumer Credit Transactions and a Critique of the TerritorialApplication of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 16, 18 (1974) (footnote omitted).
55. The states employ widely divergent sanctions to deal with usury, ranging
from merely depriving the lender of excess interest to holding the contract completely unenforceable. The sanction employed will demonstrate the nature of the
state's policy with respect to usury far more than the permissible rate of interest. See
Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 279, 315-21 (1972).
56. Weintraub, supra note 54, at 31.
57. See Sedler, supra note 55, at 321-23.
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mensions. 58 To further minimize the difficulties posed by this situation, he emphasizes that the lender's state would apply its law
if suit were brought there, because of its interest in protecting
its resident lender who acted entirely within the state. The lender could thus bring suit against the borrower in a favorable forum
by using the long-arm act. 59 Weintraub's real concern, however, is with the situation where the borrower sues the lender in
the borrower's state, which he says would often be constitutionally permissible. 6 0 Here, he maintains that the borrower's state
should not apply its law fully. Instead, it should "enforce the repayment agreement but in an amount and manner that accords
with the limits and requirements of the borrower's state." 6 1 In
other words, the borrower's state should apply its law on the permissible rate of interest, but should not void the contract entirely.
Presumably, the lender could enforce the otherwise invalid contract to the extent of the unpaid principal and the interest
62
permitted under the law of the borrower's state.
It is noteworthy that Weintraub does not suggest that the
courts of the lender's state adopt this compromise solution. In his
view, considerations of fairness dictate that courts in the borrower's
state apply the validating law of the lender's state when the borrower seeks out the lender in the lender's state and the transaction
is connected entirely with that state. Weintraub's special multistate
rule, then, is not designed to accommodate the conflicting policies
and interests of the involved states, but only to avoid what he characterizes as an unfair decision by the borrower's state in a particular
factual setting. It is thus internally inconsistent: It forces the forum
to sacrifice its borrower-protecting policy simply to minimize unfairness to a particular lender without attempting to recognize or effectuate the conflicting policy of the lender's state. If the borrower's state considers it unfair to apply its own law to a case, it will
not do so; and the courts of the borrower's state, in the usury context, generally have not applied their own law where the impetus
for the loan came from the borrower and the transaction was con58. Weintraub, supra note 54, at 32-36.
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id. at 36-37.
61. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
62. In effect, this is the "rule of validity" solution that is applied where the
contract is usurious under the law of both states: The court enforces the contract in
part by applying the least severe sanction. Here it is applied where the contract is
usurious under the law of only one of the states, but the purpose is the same-to protect the lender from the more severe sanction. See Sedler, supra note 55, at 318-21.
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nected entirely with the lender's state. 63 But the borrower's
state will apply its own law if it does not consider it fundamentally
unfair to do so,6 or, more accurately, if it concludes that its inter-

est in applying its own law to implement the policy reflected in
that law outweighs any possible unfairness to the stay-at-home

lender. 65 And once it makes this self-interested determination, it
will be indisposed--contrary to Weintraub's theory-to mitigate

the sanctions that are an integral part of its policy 66 and which it
imposes for the precise purpose of deterring what it considers to
67
be victimization of its resident borrowers.
The internal inconsistency in Weintraub's proposed multistate
solution, then, is that it asks the forum, here the borrower's state,

to compromise its policy, not to accommodate the interests of the
other involved state, but to minimize unfairness to the stay-at-

home lender after the forum has rejected the view that fairness
requires displacement of its own law. If the forum does not
think that fairness requires displacement of its law in whole, it

is difficult to see why it would think that fairness requires its displacement in part. Weintraub's multistate solution is based on
considerations of fairness rather than on accommodating conflicting state interests and thus does not do what it purports to do:
It does not "give maximum effect and . . . cause minimal impairment to the relevant and otherwise irreconcilable policies of the
contact states." 68 Quite the contrary, it seriously impairs the
borrower-protecting policy of the borrower's state by removing the
63.

See, e.g., Dairy Equip. Co. v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301, 442 P.2d 437 (1968).

Cf. Burr v. Renewal Guaranty Corp., 105 Ariz. 549, 468 P.2d 576 (1970) (Arizona borrower initiated transaction after national advertising campaign by Colorado lender;
Colorado usury law applied).
64. Cf. Oxford Consumer Discount Co. v. Stefanelli, 55 N.J. 489, 262 A.2d 874
(although loan transaction itself was connected entirely with Pennsylvania, loan was
secured by mortgage on New Jersey realty, and New Jersey court applied its
borrower-protecting law to that transaction), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
Following the decision in Stefanelli, the New Jersey Legislature specifically
amended the statute to ensure that the same result would obtain in the future. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:11A-57 (West Supp. 1978-1979). This and other statutes are discussed by Weintraub, who notes that they are generally inconsistent with his "new
rule." Weintraub, supra note 54, at 38-43.
65. Possible unfairness to the other party may be sufficient to persuade the forum that it has no real interest in applying its law on the point in issue. See Sedler,
supra note 3, at 224-26. For discussion of the application of this proposition to the
stay-at-home lender in the usury situation, see Sedler, supra note 55, at 324-25.
66. See note 55 supra.
67. For Weintraub's discussion of this point, see Weintraub, supra note 54, at
37-38.
68. Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
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policy's most effective sanction-complete invalidation of the transaction. If the borrower's home state is persuaded that possible unfairness to the stay-at-home lender is more important than
advancing its borrower-protecting policy in these circumstances
-which it well may be 6 9-- it will not apply its own law at all.
But if it is not so persuaded, it will not displace its law in part
by applying a special multistate solution, precisely because such
application seriously impairs its borrower-protecting policy.
Thus, it is evident that the substantive multistate solutions
proposed by Von Mehren and by Weintraub do not do what they
purport to do. For this reason alone, both "solutions" should be,
and will be, rejected by the courts.
PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS

Professor Twerski and Ms. Mayer claim to have devised a
"practical and realistic method of accommodating conflicting state
policies" in cases where the clash is between "liability rules which
stem from concern that the judicial process is inadequate to the
task of arriving at truth." 70 Their "procedural" approach establishes
multistate rules that advance the interests of both involved states.
They state:
The multistate rule differs in content from the domestic rule,
but attempts to address the basic policy concerns that motivated
the adoption of the domestic rule. It seeks accommodation with
the rules of other concerned jurisdictions when such an accommodation reflects sensitivity to a state's own real interests, which
71
have been subordinated in purely domestic litigation.
This accommodation can be achieved, Twerski and Mayer maintain, when substantive rules denying or sharply limiting a cause of
action "are based on the inability of the courts to assure themselves
that the parties and witnesses are not involved in fraud, duress,
collusion, or fabrication." 7 2 Here,
[b]y creating a multistate rule that raises or lowers the standard
of proof required to establish a case, courts can accommodate

69. See, e.g., Burr v. Renewal Guaranty Corp., 105 Ariz. 549, 468 P.2d 576
(1970); Dairy Equip. Co. v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301, 442 P.2d 437 (1968).
70. Twerski & Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice-of-Law
Problems--At the Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 Nw. U.L. RsV. 781,
782-83 (1979).
71. Id. at 783-84.
72. Id. at 786.
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differing views. This accommodation is possible because the underlying substantive law is not in conflict; rather, the conflict lies
in the method by which the substantive rights may be estab73
lished.
Unlike substantive compromises, where each state receives only
"half a loaf," the "procedural" multistate solution, changing for
both courts the burden of proof otherwise required to establish a
74
case, "maximizes both conflicting policies."
Twerski and Mayer illustrate this approach primarily with respect to guest statutes and the statute of frauds. 75 To implement
their multistate accommodation in the guest-statute situation, both
states would permit recovery on the basis of ordinary negligence,
but require its proof by clear and convincing evidence. 76 Similarly,
in the statute-of-frauds situation, they advocate permitting enforcement of the oral contract if its existence can be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. 7 7 They argue that "[bly applying the multistate rule to a case in which, admittedly, a state cannot assure itself that justice will be done, even in a totally domestic setting,
each state receives a full loaf by giving effect to its primary goal
and the normally subordinated goal." 718 I will examine whether the
proposed solutions in these two situations actually achieve their objective of "maximizing both conflicting policies."
Turning first to the guest-statute situation, consider the case of
a plaintiff from a nonguest-statute state who is injured while a passenger in an automobile operated by a defendant from a gueststatute state. In interest-analysis terms, this presents a true conflict
irrespective of where the accident occurs. In practice, however,
the result may differ depending on whether the accident occurred
in plaintiff's or defendant's home state, since the situs of the accident may determine where suit can be brought. When the acci73. Id.
74. Id. at 794 (footnote omitted).
75. The authors note that there are certain areas where this solution will not
work because "the policy differences betveen states raise a genuine conflict regarding the proper way to resolve a problem," such as dram shop act liability or
gambling contracts. Id. at 801-02.
76. Id. at 793. This solution is not limited to the true conflict situation, but
would apply to all guest-host litigation, except those cases that both present a false
conflict in terms of interest analysis and are territorially dominated by one state. Id.

at 800-01.
77. Id. at 795-97.

78. Id. at 793-94. The reference to "normally subordinated goal" is to the goal
that is subordinated in the domestic context. See id. at 789-92.
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dent occurs in the plaintiff's state, suit will be brought there, and
that state will apply its law allowing recovery. 79 If the accident occurs in the defendant's state, and suit is brought there, that state
will apply its law denying recovery.8 0 But even though the accident occurs in the defendant's state, suit can sometimes be brought
in the plaintiff's state, 8 ' and in these cases it is likely that the
s2
plaintiff will prevail.
Twerski and Mayer would have both states apply the substantive standard of ordinary negligence, leveling the guest-statute
state's higher standard of gross negligence, but would require that
ordinary negligence be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Raising the standard of proof from a mere proponderance to clear
and convincing purportedly preserves the safeguard against fraud
and collusion embodied in the substantive standard of gross negligence.8 3 In support of their multistate accommodation, Twerski
and Mayer argue that the substantive rules of both the recovery
state and the guest-statute state are based on "statistical justice."
The recovery state has made the judgment that while there is a
danger of collusion in the guest-host suit, that concern should be
subordinated in favor of compensation. The guest-statute state, on
the other hand, has subordinated the concern for compensation in
favor of preventing collusion. While each state's domestic rule is
applied fully by the courts of that state in a domestic case, in an interstate case the courts should consider the subordinated policy as
well. By considering the subordinated policy, this special multistate
solution in effect merges the dominant and subordinated policies of
both states. According to its proponents, this solution "would foster
not only the shared interests of both states in preventing fraud and
collusion and permitting legitimate recoveries, but would allow also
for judicial control of those cases that were made suspect by use of
84
the directed verdict."
Consider the soundness of this solution first from the guest79. There are no cases directly involving this situation, probably because the
result would be so obvious that no one would bother to litigate it. The litigated cases
involve the situation where an act done elsewhere produced a foreseeable risk of
harm in the forum. The choice-of-law rule is that when a forum resident suffers injury in the forum either because of an act done there or because of an act done elsewhere that creates a foreseeable risk of harm in the forum, the forum will apply its
own law allowing recovery. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 1035-36.
80. Id. at 1037-38.
81. See Sedler, supra note 52, at 331-37.
82. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 1036-37.
83. Twerski & Mayer, supra note 70, at 793-94.
84. Id. at 793.
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statute state's perspective. In a suit before its courts it is asked to
allow recovery on the basis of ordinary negligence, even though
the state legislature proscribed recovery unless gross negligence is
shown. The justification for this deviation is that the court is still
accomplishing the legislative objective by requiring a higher
standard of proof. It would allow recovery only when satisfied by
clear and convincing evidence that the host and guest were not engaged in collusion. The legislature, however, did not deal with the
problem of collusive suits in the host-guest situation8 5 by requiring
a higher standard of proof of ordinary negligence. If it believed
that the problem of collusion could be solved by a higher standard
of proof, it would have required such a standard. Rather, it dealt
with the problem by imposing a substantively different standard of
liability in such cases. While the line between gross negligence
86
and ordinary negligence may be difficult to define conceptually,
it is clear that gross negligence requires a showing of a level of culpability other than ordinary negligence. If that showing cannot be
made, the court will direct a verdict for the defendant. Those cases
where the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failing to allege
facts amounting to gross negligence 87 illustrate that gross negligence is substantively different from ordinary negligence and requires a different level of culpability. No matter how clear and convincing the proof of ordinary negligence may be, it still does not
rise to the level of gross negligence.
Twerski and Mayer are in error when they state that in the
guest-statute situation, "the underlying substantive law is not in
conflict; rather, the conflict lies in the method by which the sub85. Twerski and Mayer assume that the only purpose behind a guest statute is
to prevent collusive suits. Accord, Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 575, 249 N.E.2d
394, 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 523-24 (1969). For purposes of interest analysis, how-

ever, a rule of substantive law should be presumed to reflect all legitimate policies
that it could possibly serve. A guest statute can also serve the policies of protecting
hosts from suits by ungrateful guests (not a very realistic policy, but certainly a legitimate one) and of excluding guest-passenger cases from the insurer's liability,
thereby possibly lowering insurance rates or increasing insurance companies' profits.
See Sedler, supra note 3, at 199-200. While only the defendant's home state is interested in applying its law to implement any of these policies, id. at 200, the Twerski
and Mayer solution is not fashioned with reference to these other policies.
86. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971).
87. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973);
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972);
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). In most
cases, the question arises in the context of a motion to dismiss the complaint for a
failure to allege gross negligence or a motion to strike the guest-statute defense,
which in turn is based on the plaintiff's failure to allege gross negligence.
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stantive rights may be established.- 88 The underlying substantive
law is in conflict because one state requires a showing of only ordinary negligence while the other state requires a showing of greater
culpability-gross negligence. While it may be argued that the concern for collusion could have been met by requiring a higher
standard of proof of ordinary negligence, the guest-statute state
goes further by requiring, not a higher standard of proof, but a different degree of culpability. Its reasons for having done so may relate to the possibility that the collusion it fears includes collusion at
the subliminal level: Since the guest and the host are not really adverse, and the host wants the guest to recover, the host and the
guest may see the host's "routine driving behavior" as "negligent."
But unless they are willing to commit perjury, they cannot manufacture facts that did not happen. So even if the host and guest
both cast the host's driving in the worst possible light, it still may
not rise to the level of culpability required for a showing of gross
negligence.
In other words, by imposing a higher standard of liability the
legislature made it almost impossible for the guest and the host to
collude, consciously or unconsciously, to bring about recovery. The
legislative policy is thwarted whenever the plaintiff can recover on
a showing of ordinary negligence, no matter how clear and convincing its proof. Therefore, the policy of the guest-statute state is
certainly not "maximized." What Twerski and Mayer are proposing
to the court of the guest-statute state is that it adopt a standard of
proof that will enable it to decide whether there is collusion. However, the legislative policy is to prevent collusion, conscious or unconscious, by requiring a degree of culpability that, in its view, the
host and the guest cannot collude to establish. Surely Twerski and
Mayer's solution will be unacceptable to the courts of the gueststatute state, 89 and those courts will not, by the remotest stretch of
the imagination, believe that it "maximizes" the policy of their
state.
The recovery state, on the other hand, is not asked to sacrifice
much. It is doubtful whether a jury can perceive any real difference between preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence. 9 0 In the typical accident case, particularly where
88.
89.

Twerski & Mayer, supra note 70, at 786.
See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 1, at 1037-38.

90. As to the purported difference between these standards, see the discussion
in McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 251-54
(1944).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss4/1

20

1979]

CRITIQUE
OF SPECIAL
SOLUTIONS
Sedler:
On Choice
of LawMULTISTATE
and the Great
Quest: A Critique of Special Multi

the evidence on the driver's conduct is not sharply conflicting, the
jury is not called upon to weigh evidence but to decide whether
the driver's conduct reaches the required level of culpability. So
long as the standard of culpability is ordinary negligence, the jury
will probably be no more or less likely to find negligence if it is instructed in terms of the preponderance standard or the clear-andconvincing standard. If an interstate compact were proposed between guest-statute states and recovery states embodying the
solution proposed by Twerski and Mayer, there can be no doubt
that the recovery states would derive the greater benefit. But since
there is no interstate compact, and since the question arises in the
context of litigation between private parties where the court's responsibility is to achieve a sound and fair result in the case before
it, it would make no sense to the recovery state to impose a higher
burden of proof for the purpose of "maximizing conflicting policies"
when this solution does not do so at all.
Since conflicting policies in the guest-statute situation are reflected in differing standards of liability, not in differing burdens of
proof, these conflicting policies are not "maximized" by a multistate solution that leaves one state's standard of liability intact
while imposing a higher burden of proof to establish that standard-especially when the burden will probably not make any practical difference anyway. Thus the "procedural" multistate solution does not accomplish what it purports to do with its "full loaf"
any more than the "substantive" multistate solutions do with their

"half loaf."
Similarly, in the statute-of-frauds situation, Twerski and Mayer
err when they assume that "the underlying substantive law is not
in conflict; rather the conflict lies in the method by which the substantive rights may be established. "91 It is on this mistaken assumption that they base their solution of allowing the oral contract
to be enforced if its existence can be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 92 Although one purpose of the statute of frauds is to
prevent fraudulent claims, it also embodies a transaction-regulating
policy that enforces a state's view on how certain transactions
should be conducted. The state insists that it will not enforce certain contracts unless they are in writing or unless a written memorandum satisfying the statute's requirements has been made. These
requisites reflect a conscious value choice. The state knows that as
91. Twerski & Mayer, supra note 70, at 786.
92. See id. at 794-97.
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a result of the statute some actual oral contracts will not be enforced; to that extent the statute enables some parties to perpetrate
fraud. 9 3 It has decided to pay that price to protect innocent parties
from fraudulent claims, and, more importantly, to set standards of
commercial behavior. In effect, the state tells parties wishing to
enter into certain consensual transactions: "If you are really serious
about your contract, put it in writing, or at least make a sufficient
memorandum of it; otherwise, the contract will be unenforceable,
no matter how much proof you can muster." To the state with a
statute of frauds, it does not matter that in a particular case the existence of an oral contract can be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Enforcing the contract thwarts the statute's transactionregulating policy.
The transaction-regulating purpose of the statute of frauds is
most evident in a case such as Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v.
Daystrom, Inc.,94 which involved the New York statute of frauds
applicable to business brokerage contracts. In Daystrom, a New
York broker made a claim for a finder's fee against a New Jersey
corporation. The plaintiff was engaged in bringing American and
European firms together for the purpose of affiliation and merger.
The parties had entered into a written agreement in which the defendant agreed to pay a finder's fee if a relationship were established with a certain foreign firm. The proposed merger fell
through when the foreign firm was acquired by a larger company.
The latter, however, proceeded to merge with the defendant, and
the plaintiff contended that the defendant's president had orally
agreed to extend the written agreement to cover this merger.
While some negotiations took place in New Jersey, many occurred
in New York; there had been an advertisement in a New York
newspaper; and the principals were introduced in New York. The
alleged oral agreement was unenforceable under the New York
statute of frauds, but enforceable under New Jersey law.
The New York court treated the case as a false conflict, saying
that it had an interest in applying its statute of frauds to bar the
suit, while New Jersey had no interest in applying its law. 95 The
93. Twerski and Mayer note that "much fraud is fostered by the statute of
frauds." Id. at 795. The state enacting a statute of frauds is aware of this as well.
94. 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
95. Id. at 384-85, 248 N.E.2d at 583-84, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28. Even if the
New York court had found that a true conflict existed and that New Jersey had an interest in allowing recovery by a New York broker against a New Jersey principal, it
would have preferred its own policy and interest. The forum will apply its own law
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court found that one policy behind the New York statute of frauds
is the protection of principals engaged in the sale of businesses
from finder's fee claims unsupported by written evidence. Since
New York is an international center for the purchase and sale of
businesses, New York has an interest in applying its policy to protect foreign principals who utilize the services of New York brokers. Moreover, affording foreign principals the greatest degree of
protection encourages the use of New York brokers and contributes
to the economic development of the state.96
Commenting on Daystrom, Twerski and Mayer note that
"[b]oth New Jersey and New York were sufficiently involved [with
the transaction] to bring their policies on enforcement of [business]
brokerage contracts into play." 9 7 This being so, they contend that
the case was resolvable through their proposed multistate solution:
Instead of engaging in the all-or-nothing approach of interest
analysis, which required interest manipulation, it would have
been better for the court to apply a multistate substantive rule
that would have permitted the enforcement of the contract upon
proof of its existence and terms by clear and convincing evidence. Whether this exacting standard is met may be somewhat
affected by the bias of the judiciary to issues raised under the
statute of frauds. Nevertheless, applying the higher standard of
proof would allow for the policies of both concerned states to
find expression in a conflicts setting. 98
This contention, however, indicates that Twerski and Mayer have
misconceived the policy reflected in New York's statute of frauds.
Enforcement of this contract, even if its existence had been conclusively proved by the most clear and convincing evidence, 99 thwarts
New York's policy on business brokerage contracts: Unless the parties have shown that they are sufficiently serious about the contract
whenever it has a real interest in implementing that law's policy if this is not fundamentally unfair to the other party. There is thus no reason in the context of conflicts
litigation to distinguish between the false conflict where the forum is the only interested state and the true conflict where the forum is one of the interested states, since
in both situations the forum will apply its own law. See Sedler, supra note 3, at
220-22.
96. 24 N.Y.2d at 383-84, 248 N.E.2d at 582-83, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27. Accord,
Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
97. Twerski & Mayer, supra note 70, at 797 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. (footnote omitted). For Twerski's discussion of "interest manipulation"
in Daystrom, see Twerski, Choice-of-Law in Contracts-Some Thoughts on the
Weintraub Approach, 57 IowA L. REv. 1239, 1242-43 (1972).
99. Assume, for example, that the defendant's president admitted on the stand
that the written agreement was extended to cover the subsequent acquisition.
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to have embodied their understanding in written documents, the
agreement is unenforceable. 10 0 By regulating the conduct of parties
engaging in business brokerage transactions, New York has put brokers on notice that oral brokerage contracts are unenforceable. The
broker in Daystrom was a New York resident and operated out of
New York. Not only could he be expected to conform his conduct
to the standard demanded by New York law, but he recognized the
need to comply with that standard when he put the original brokerage agreement in writing. 10 1 The defendant's president may well
have orally agreed to extend the written agreement to cover the subsequent transaction, but the plaintiff must have known that this
would not satisfy the New York statute. To allow him to now enforce the oral agreement allows him to avoid New York's regulatory
policy in circumstances where New York is clearly interested in
securing compliance. 10 2 Surely enforcement of the contract, no
matter how clear and convincing the evidence of its existence may
be, will not "allow . . . the policies of [New York] to find expression in a conflicts setting."' 1 3 It will thwart that policy entirely.
The New York statute of frauds also addresses principals, particularly foreign principals, who the state hopes will utilize New
York brokers for their transactions. The statute in effect informs
them: "You are free to enter into negotiations with New York brokers, but unless you commit your agreement to writing nothing
you say will later be construed as an agreement to pay a finders
fee."' 1 4 If New York enforces an oral contract against a foreign
100. New York courts have strictly construed the statute-of-frauds' requirements. See, e.g., Kobre v. Instrument Syss. Corp., 54 A.D.2d 625, 387 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1st Dep't 1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 862, 374 N.E.2d 131, 403 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1978).
101. In Daystrom Judge Fuld relied on this fact alone to sustain the defense of
the statute of frauds. 24 N.Y.2d at 386-87, 248 N.E.2d at 584, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 828-29
(Fuld, C.J., concurring).
102. For discussion of New York's interest in having brokers comply with its
regulatory policy when they are acting in New York, see Pallavicini v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 41 A.D.2d 66, 341 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1973) (New York law
applied to bar claim for finder's fee made by nonresident broker who conducted
some negotiations in New York), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 913, 316 N.E.2d 722, 359 N.Y.S.2d

290 (1974).
103. Twerski & Mayer, supra note 70, at 797 (footnote omitted).
104. Where the transaction does not satisfy the New York statute of frauds, the
broker cannot even recover reasonable compensation on a quantum meruit theory.
See Minichiello v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 521, 525, 223 N.E.2d 793,
795, 277 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (1966); accord, Denny v. American Tobacco Co., 308 F.
Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In Denny the court refused to apply California law to
hold a New York corporation liable for reasonable compensation to a California resident who solicited a finder's fee by sending a letter to an officer of the New York
corporation advising him that a California-based company might be for sale and that
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principal, then, again, no matter how clear and convincing the evidence of its existence, New York's policy is defeated by denying
the principal the security afforded by New York law. Doing so, it
removes a primary incentive for the principal to utilize New York
brokers.
As in the guest-statute situation, the conflicting statute-offrauds policies do not relate to how the existence of liability should
be proved, but to the underlying standards of liability. By enacting
a statute of frauds, New York has not merely tried to prevent enforcement of fraudulent claims; it has imposed a standard of behavior for certain commercial transactions that demands that the parties show sufficient seriousness about the transaction to put it in
writing. To coerce compliance with this standard, New York refuses to enforce any contract that does not measure up to it. Its
policy will be defeated if it enforces such a contract, no matter how
clear and convincing the proof of its existence may be.
Again, in the statute-of-frauds setting, as in the guest-statute
situation, the "procedural" multistate solution does not do what it
purports to do: It does not maximize the conflicting policies of the
involved states.
CONCLUSION

All of the proposed special multistate solutions fail because
they do not do what they purport to do. They do not accommodate
the conflicting interests of the involved states, because the bases
for solution, whether "substantive" or "procedural," have nothing
to do with the policies reflected in the conflicting laws. Von
Mehren's solutions are premised on reducing the amount of damages recoverable when the conflicting policies find their source in
different standards of liability. The conflicting policies are not rationally accommodated, therefore, by imposing liability but reducing the amount of damages. Weintraub's solution in the interstate
small-loan situation combines the laws of the involved states to
be fair to the stay-at-home lender. But if application of the borrower state's statute is considered unfair, that law will not be applied at all; if its application is not considered unfair, there is no
reason why it should only be applied in part. And the TwerskiMayer "procedural" solutions are based on raising the burden of
he should reply if interested. The officer did not reply, and although the New York
corporation eventually did acquire the company, the court held that the corporation
was entitled to take advantage of the New York statute of frauds in the circumstances
presented. For further discussion of this case, see Sedler, supra note 3, at 225-26.
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proof when the conflicting laws reflect differing standards of conduct and liability. All of the multistate solutions, then, turn out to
be internally inconsistent and functionally unsound. The courts will
not, and should not, apply them.
The "Great Quest" for solutions to the true conflict' 0 5 other
than by applying the forum's own law will probably continue. In
the meantime, courts will continue to decide cases as they have
been doing: generally applying their own law whenever they have
a real interest in doing so and when its application is not fundamentally unfair to the other party.' 0 6 On the whole, they have
reached functionally sound and fair results. 10 7 Professor Leflar observes:
The fact is that most American courts today are moving to what
they call "the" new law of conflict of laws. It is a conglomerate,
and not a bad one.
In terms of location, this body of law is being lifted up by
the courts to a well-watered plateau high above the sinkhole it
once occupied. No location lasts forever, and there are vistas beyond the plateau, but it is a rest-stop now.' 08
It is precisely because conflicts law"is at this plateau that we may
properly be skeptical about "new solutions" that promise much,
but deliver little. With all due respect to their proponents, I must
conclude that special multistate solutions fall into this category.
R. CRAMPTON, D. CmuE & H. KAY, supra note 17,at 296.
106. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 223-27. In the unprovided for case, where neither state has an interest in applying its law on the point in issue, the courts for the
most part decide the case with reference to the common policies reflected in the
laws of the involved states, which ordinarily results in the imposition of liability.
See, e.g., Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bolgrean v.
Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972); Van Dyke v. Bolves, 107 N.J. Super. 338,
258 A.2d 372 (App. Div. 1969); Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973);
Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp.,
87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).
107. See generally Leflar, supra note 2.
108. Id. at 26.
105.
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